

Power, Equality, Humility and Suspicion

1. Introduction

- 1.1. One of the great perils for any theologian is the genetic fallacy, that is, accrediting or discrediting an idea because of who expressed the idea. The genetic fallacy is a species of invalid argument. Recently Miranda Fricker has developed this point further, in terms of what she calls 'testimonial injustice'.¹ Giving wrong credit to a speaker is not merely *logically* flawed as an invalid method, she argues, but also *ethically* flawed because it treats some-one wrongly.
- 1.2. Fricker goes on to say that such testimonial injustice readily arises from pre-conceptions or pre-judgments about the speaker him or herself. The issue here is identity, not so much who some-one is, but who they are perceived or construed to be. Pre-conceptions or pre-judgments are not necessarily wrong, as Fricker notes. But obviously it becomes important to be conscious of the pre-conceptions we possess if we are not to commit testimonial injustice against each other. Hermeneutics are not pre-suppositionless, as has often been noted.
- 1.3. In this connection, we should add that pre-suppositions or pre-conceptions are held within a network of associated ideas, and no doubt have a strength corresponding to the position the pre-supposition occupies within that network of associated ideas. The pre-supposition may be peripheral or utterly central.
- 1.4. With this in mind, I intend in this paper to explore what seem to me to be the two sets of associated ideas articulated in these conversations by AWESOME and REFORM participants respectively. I acknowledge there are indeed limitations to this: I am not a spokesman for every REFORM participant, and I may not represent everyone's view. Similarly, in articulating the AWESOME network of associated ideas, there is a double danger, both of a mis-hearing on my part of what was said and also of thinking that a view is general when it is actually the position of only one AWESOME participant.

¹ *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. 2010. Oxford: OUP.

- 1.5. The reason why this has become necessary, I think, is that we are not simply faced with the question of 'Do we both have evangelical hermeneutics?' Over our meetings in 2010 a meta-hermeneutical question has emerged, which has not been explicitly articulated in the meetings between both 'sides' (I use the oppositional language for convenience), although it may have been in our post-conversation meetings with fellow-participants from our own 'sides'. The meta-hermeneutical question is 'How do we construe the other "side's" hermeneutics?' Put another way, it is not enough to swap comments about hermeneutics, important as that is. We need to acknowledge that we exercise hermeneutics ***on each other's hermeneutics***.
- 1.6. To deny this dimension and insist that we listen to each other's hermeneutical conclusions 'neutrally' risks tacitly privileging our own hermeneutics of the other side's hermeneutics: 'they say the passage means this and claim they have good exegetical warrant for it, but actually we can see that what they really mean is something quite different.' Assessment of some-one's hermeneutics is no more a 'neutral' and 'dispassionate' exercise than hermeneutics itself is.
- 1.7. We need to acknowledge this meta-hermeneutical question for several reasons.
- 1.8. First, I take it that all of us are committed in an important sense to a hermeneutics of suspicion. This is quite reasonable in an Augustinian framework which insists on the fallen-ness of the intellect and of the Lutheran stress that I am *simul iustus et peccator*: since I am, though justified, not yet perfected, it is reasonable to scrutinise my motives as some-one who is justified yet sinful. Proper charity towards each other does not involve a presumption of sinful perfection in this life. It is only logical to recognise that my 'suspicious' evaluation of some-one else's hermeneutics may understandably call for suspicion from others.
- 1.9. Secondly, refusing to recognise the meta-hermeneutical question risks becoming a way of playing a tacit game of power, and privileging one's own position. This would be inconsistent with the spirit of charitable listening we have sought in our conversations, on which so many of us have commented.

- 1.10. Thirdly, we must recognise that many of us at this stage of our conversations are in a state of cognitive rest. I suspect each side has found it odd and frustrating that the other side remains unpersuaded by what seems to us so basic and obvious. Both sides profess an evangelical hermeneutic, and in those circumstances one naturally inquires as to why we find each other's arguments unpersuasive. One might put it this way: 'Why do I find this argument so much less convincing than its advocate does? She or he clearly believes it, so why don't I?' At this point we should at least pose the question of what the network of ideas is through which we hear the hermeneutical attempts of the other. We should face Fricker's question of whether we have committed testimonial injustice.
- 1.11. Fourthly, I suspect it is time we honestly faced the issue of whether, despite increasingly warm personal relationships, we do not regard each other with a fair amount of suspicion.
- 1.12. Hence, if we are to do testimonial justice to each other, I think we must face the meta-hermeneutical question of how we hear each other's hermeneutics. To do this, I think we can profitably reflect on the networks of associated ideas that each side seems to possess.

2. AWESOME's view in the conversations

- 2.1. Our discussions have been nothing if not wide-ranging, and in the course of them I have come to understand AWESOME participants to hold (with all the caveats already noted) to a network of ideas along these lines.

Marriage

- 2.2. With respect to marriage, the view is that Genesis 2 does not establish an order as between husband and wife, or man and woman more generally. Rather, Genesis 2:20 supports the idea of mutual help between husband and wife and relationality with difference, but not ordinal subordination. The naming of the woman in Genesis 2:23 is likewise not to be taken as an exercise of authority, since the elements of an authority-based naming formula are absent. We did not discuss Genesis 3:16 and the statement by God '...he [sc Adam] shall rule over you.', and I do not know what the AWESOME account of this is.

- 2.3. Continuing with marriage, a central passage for consideration was Ephesians 5:22-33. Several points were made here, first, (by some, I think) that *hypotassō* (v 24) did not mean 'submit', that *kephalē* did not include notions of authority in its semantic range, and that a wife who loved her husband as Christ did the church was within the parameters of marital relationship set down by Ephesians 5. The marital relationship was in that sense 'symmetrical' (my term).
- 2.4. In support of this symmetry, reference was made to 1 Corinthians 7:1ff, with its explanation that husband and wife have authority over the other's body.
- 2.5. The pattern therefore emerges of a symmetrical, non-ordinal or authority-neutral view of marriage.

Trinity

- 2.6. The *kephalē* terminology is also relevant for 1 Corinthians 11:3 with its statement that God is the head of Christ. Given the AWESOME view of the semantic range of *kephalē*, clearly this was not construed as a relation of authority between Father and Son.
- 2.7. In fact, as regards the Trinitarian relations, the AWESOME view emerged as asserting relational symmetry between Father and Son such that the Son is not in a personal relation of obedience to the Father. Rather, the point argued was that the Father and Son had one will, so that relations of obedience between them were not logically possible.
- 2.8. As regards statements concerning the Son's obedience I am not sure whether these were referred to the Son's human nature, and therefore only arose in terms of the human nature's relation with God. That seemed to be the direction, but I may have misconstrued this.
- 2.9. What was clear, to my mind, was an insistence that relations within the triune God were egalitarian with respect to authority.² Naturally, there are clear advantages to this position: it removes the possibility of a perfect personal relationship between ontological equals where authority rests with one and not the other. An ordered Trinity of this

² Prominent advocates of this include Gilbert Bilezikian and Kevin Giles

type would open the possibility of relationships which were asymmetrical with respect to authority, but moral; unequal in that respect, but not unfair.

Other New Testament Passages

- 2.10. Further New Testament passages indicated the full participation of women at several levels of ministry in the New Testament church, notably Priscilla as an instructress and Junias as an apostle. Taken with the clear participation in public worship envisaged by Paul in 1 Corinthians 11 (in prophesy and prayer), this indicates an equality between the sexes in ministry within the life of a local church.

1 Timothy 2

- 2.11. When one approaches 1 Timothy 2 in the light of these considerations about marriage and Trinity, the notion that relations in a local church may feature a situation where authority is not equally distributed as between the sexes starts to appear eccentric. It tends to shut 1 Tim off from the egalitarianism seen in marriage and Trinity, and the apparent open-ness to women's ministry noted above. It amounts, it might be said, to a dissonant reading. Naturally, reading one part of Scripture contrary to others is not something an Anglican Evangelical would wish to do.
- 2.12. Nor, on the AWESOME view is this dissonant reading necessary. Appeals were made to the effects of *Romanitas* on Ephesian women (Ephesian 'Essex girls', as has been said), and/or the position and effects of the Diana cult in Ephesus, and/or the fact that women were the false teachers in the Ephesian church or churches. I was not clear which of these possibilities was generally supported by the AWESOME group, but it seemed clear to me that what was envisaged was that a particular local problem had produced the prohibition of 1 Tim 2:12, and that accordingly, any prohibition it contained was of limited application only.

General

- 2.13. Perhaps wrongly, I thought I sensed some other misgivings along with the foregoing more specifically textual arguments.

- 2.14. To begin with, I think some AWESOME participants feel at least some REFORM participants are not engaging fully with the arguments and have no good reason for not accepting them, notably with regard to Genesis 2. To this extent, I think there is suspicion between us. I mean this descriptively, not pejoratively. I think suspicion is inevitable, and, given our joint commitment to acknowledging the effects of sin, not unreasonable. Nor do I think AWESOME has a monopoly of suspicion. REFORM, myself included, have our own suspicions. I merely advocate recognising this.
- 2.15. Secondly, the consistent thread in this network of associated ideas is a particular understanding of equality. The critical point seems to be the relation between equality and the distribution of power and authority. As between husband and wife, as between Father and Son and as regards men and women in the presbyterate, ontological equality seems understood as necessitating symmetrical, non-ordinal relationships.³ Related to this, perhaps, is a notion that it is unjust to distribute power unequally because of gender or other personal difference. To adopt a phrase from the old Court of Chancery: 'Equality is equity'. The point has often been made in the case for women bishops that it is a simple matter of justice, and it seems to me that the insistence by AWESOME participants on equal power relations belongs in this area.
- 2.16. This consistent thread seems to me to explain something of the passion behind the pro-women bishops case. The argument is not a trivial one, but has a central, co-ordinating role in the network of ideas that AWESOME participants have put forward over understandings of church order, Trinity and marriage.
- 2.17. Thirdly, and this may be over-sensitive on my part, but I wonder whether AWESOME participants do not harbour misgivings about REFORM participants' attitudes to power and authority. Most REFORM members are male, and naturally one wonders whether the antipathy to women bishops is not related to an attempt to keep power within a charmed, male, circle.

³ Thus e.g. Kevin Giles sees ordinal Trinitarian thought as incipiently Arian.

2.18. Moreover, if I were an AWESOME participant committed to the equality ideas outlined above, I would find it disconcerting to have authority relations being argued for in marriage and the Trinity, as well as a traditional view of 1 Tim 2 being taken. I think I would ask if this does not show an unhealthy concern with power, with some-one being in charge.⁴ I think I would ask if this is not rather like T.W. Adorno's authoritarian personality, with its connotations of either needing to be over others, or very definitely under another.

Unclarities

2.19. I am acutely aware that there are many areas where I do not know the mind of AWESOME participants. I remain very unclear about how AWESOME participants understand the reference of Jesus in Luke 22:42 to the different wills of himself and his Father (a similar point can be made with respect to johannine passages about Jesus doing the will of the one who sent him).

2.20. I am also unsure what implications AWESOME participants draw from the egalitarian positions outlined above.

2.21. Thus, if the AWESOME understanding is right, it must follow that REFORM's Trinitarian understanding is severely flawed, if not actually Arian.⁵ Further, if the AWESOME understanding of marriage is correct, it must follow that marriages wanting to use vows of obedience for the wife should not be permitted. Husbands attempting to assert a traditional understanding of marital headship are in fact asserting a sinful and abusive relationship, and should be disciplined accordingly, because, as we have seen, the equality idea is a vital part of the network of ideas.

2.22. To this extent, trying to look at REFORM through AWESOME eyes, I think the differences between the two groups are much bigger than a difference over church order in 1 Timothy 2.

2.23. No doubt I have not captured all the nuances or even undergirding principles, for which I apologise, but this is how the AWESOME position seems to me, and why I think I and my friends must seem quite disturbing to AWESOME participants.

⁴ Precisely Rowan Williams' question about Karl Barth's insistence on God addressing us as *Lord*.

⁵ As Bilezikian and Giles, *inter alios*, have argued.

2.24. I turn now to the network of ideas that seem to me to underlie REFORM contributions.

3. REFORM's view of the conversations

3.1. Let me begin by observing that to REFORM eyes, the traditional reading of 1 Tim 2 does not seem eccentric or dissonant. Let me explain.

Marriage

3.2. We feel that Genesis 2 cannot be isolated from other passages dealing with marriage, notably Ephesians 5:22ff, since the latter cites Genesis 2, but also Genesis 3:16 since it does bear on the marriage relationship post-Fall.

3.3. With regard to Genesis 2 itself, while I do not think 'helper' supports an ordinal relationship, the naming of the woman in v 23 I think on balance does. It follows very closely on the naming of the animals, which seems related to the grant of dominion in Genesis 1:26ff. Moreover, Eve is referred to as 'the woman' in Genesis 2-3 until Adam renames her Eve (Gen 3:20), at which point she is referred to as Eve. In other words, the name Adam gives her in 2:23 is the name by which she is known, paralleling the effect of naming in Genesis 2:19 ('whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name'). With respect to the arguments regarding a naming formula, it is striking that the LXX uses the same terminology in 2:23 and 3:20. This is significant because by 3:20 God has stated (3:16) that the husband will rule over the woman.

3.4. We take the reference to authority in Gen 3:16, not as marking a further deterioration in the situation of the Fall ('rule' is not necessarily pejorative, although rule certainly can be abused), but rather as an indication of grace in preserving the marriage relationship as originally constituted in Genesis 2:18ff.

3.5. This makes for a better fit with the bulk of the NT material about husband-wife relations. The argument that *hypotassō* does not have an authority component, but speaks of something lesser ('respect') is remarkably unattractive given its use for a citizen's obligation to the

state (Romans 13:1), its use with respect to everything being put under Christ's feet (Ephesians 1:22) as well as the interchangeable way Peter employs *hypakouō* and *hypotassō* in his discussion of marriage in 1 Peter.

- 3.6. Given this, it is clear that Ephesians 5:22 certainly can mean that wives should be subject to their husbands. That it does mean this is clear from the comparison between human marriage and the Christ-church relationship. We are told in v 24 that the church is subject to Christ. This must be so, since as Ephesians 1 has made clear (and as Hebrews indicates), Jesus is the one who is given cosmic authority and in whom Psalm 110 is fulfilled. It is very odd to think the one of whom Psalm 110 is true does not have authority.
- 3.7. It is for this reason that REFORM participants were so disturbed by the notion that marriage does not feature a husband's authority, but rather authority is mutual and shared. Since Paul so strongly compares the husband with Christ, it necessarily implies that Christ and the church have a mutual authority and that just as we submit to Christ, so he submits to us. This undoes the fulfilment of Psalm 110.
- 3.8. Nor is it an answer to say that a wife fulfils her Ephesians 5 obligations by loving her husband as Christ loves the Church. The giving in view in verse 25-28 is Christ's redemptive work for the Church, and it is asymmetrical. Christ saves the Church. The Church does not save Christ, nor do Christ and Church save each other. There is an irrevocable asymmetry here. Christ gives himself asymmetrically, and he has authority asymmetrically.
- 3.9. This in turn affects how one understands the semantic range of *kephalē*. In Ephesians 5, verses 23 and 24 form a parallel in which Christ is compared to the husband and the wife to the Church. The notion of a wife's submission has been introduced in verse 22, and verse 23 then explains the command to obey (*hoti*), but does so by reference to both Christ and husband being the head. Paul does relate headship to authority here, because he explains submission by reference to headship. This is re-inforced by the return to submission language in verse 24.

- 3.10. The implication is that just as there is one head in the Church, Christ, so there is one head in marriage, the husband. However, it seems to us that AWESOME participants in fact were committing themselves to the view that in marriage both husband and wife were heads. In fact, as one considers the Church-Christ relation, it is clear that the relationships are not symmetrical.
- 3.11. This need not surprise us since elsewhere Paul stresses that a body may be composed of diverse yet integrated parts. Lack of diversity is not what the church *qua* body should be (1Cor 12:17ff, 29).
- 3.12. 1 Corinthians 7 does not detract from this, because the issue there is the restricted one of the sexual debt (*opheilē*) one partner in a marriage owes to another (one notes Paul is speaking of the body of each partner). On the other hand, the contrary reading in which this is taken as a general mutual submission simply means there is a contradiction between 1 Corinthians 7 on the one hand and Ephesians 5:22ff, Colossians 3:18, Titus 2:5 and 1 Peter 3:1ff. Such a dissonant reading of Scripture is not to be preferred.
- 3.13. To all these textual considerations should be added one further more biblical theological argument. In important respects, salvation history can be pictured as a tale of two Adams, the first Adam and the last Adam. From one or other of these two men's girdles hangs every member of our race. But the theological narrative is in terms of two **Adams** (Romans 5, 1 Corinthians 15).
- 3.14. A critical biblical theme is that Christ, the last Adam, succeeds by obeying God where the first Adam failed (see here especially the temptation narratives in the Synoptics, and the way Luke contextualises this with an Adamic genealogy).
- 3.15. However, Christ is not referred to nor depicted as the new Eve. The Adamic salvation-history narrative treats Adam as the first head of the human race, not Adam and Eve together. Put another way, if Adam is not Eve's head, as he is our racial head, how does Eve fit into the first Adam-last Adam salvation history that Paul gives us?
- 3.16. This means that we cannot accept a mutual submission account of marriage.

Trinity

- 3.17. It will be appreciated that the conclusions REFORM participants have reached about *kephalē* have implications beyond marriage, because 1 Corinthians 11:3 also uses this term to describe the relations between man/husband and woman/wife, Christ and man, and Christ and God. This brings us to the question of the inter-trinitarian relations.
- 3.18. My own feeling is that perhaps REFORM participants may not have explained clearly enough on the last occasion together what underlay a fairly obvious anxiety.
- 3.19. To begin with we note the way that Jesus the Son speaks consistently of doing the will of him who sent him. Jesus obeys. In soteriological terms this matters because Jesus' perfect obedience to God's law and will is the basis of our justification. Cranmer writes:
- He for them fulfilled the law in his life. So that now in him and by him every true Christian man may be called a fulfiller of the law; forasmuch as that which their infirmity lacketh Christ's justice hath supplied.⁶
- 3.20. In this way it is vital to note that justification is not so much 'Just-as-if-I'd-never-sinned' but more accurately 'Just-as-if-I'd-always-kept'. However, if Jesus does not genuinely obey, then he has not kept the law for us and we have no ground for our justification. Paul points out that it is by one man's obedience (*hypakouē*) that the many will be made righteous (Romans 5:19).
- 3.21. Put sharply, REFORM participants pose the question: **who** obeyed so that the law was kept for our salvation? Our answer is, the eternal Son incarnate. We do not think there is another 'who', or person, who kept the law for us, since that would really be Nestorianism. Nor do we think it adequate to say the Son only obeys in his human nature, because the issue is not the nature through which one acts, but the person and his relations: persons obey.
- 3.22. There are four considerations that weigh heavily with us here. First, the language of Scripture concerning the relations of the First and Second Persons is that of Father and Son. Within the theological

⁶ Homily on the Salvation of Mankind. Incorporated into the Anglican understanding of justification by Article 11.

grammar of Scripture, sons obey and honour fathers (Malachi 1:6; Ephesians 6:1f). The relationship is asymmetrical with respect to authority, but ontologically equal since, as the Nicene Fathers kept pointing out, fathers beget offspring who share their nature. This means that an egalitarian account of the eternal relations does not give due weight to the specific terms Scripture gives us.

- 3.23. Secondly, Jesus insists that his presence here on earth reveals himself and his Father. We cannot speculate about the Trinity, but we can know it as it is revealed to us. But what is revealed is a relationship in which Jesus distinguishes himself from his Father and claims to do his Father's will. To say that the eternal relationship is actually other than what we see and hear on earth seems to us to deny that the incarnation does reveal the Trinitarian relations. It severs the economic from the immanent Trinity and to that extent undercuts revelation.
- 3.24. Thirdly, John's Gospel repeatedly links Jesus' obedience with the notion of sending by his Father. However, the Father also sends the Spirit, as well as the Son. Now, if sending carries connotations of obedience (as both Nicenes and Arians conceded in the controversies of the 4-5th centuries), then the coming of the Spirit to us through the sending of the Father also carries connotations of obedience. But the Spirit's obedience in being sent cannot be explained by reference to an incarnation, because, of course, like the Father he is not incarnate. This suggests that it is possible to have an eternal relation, unaffected by being incarnate in which one Trinitarian Person is subordinate to another.
- 3.25. Fourthly, there is the humility of Jesus the Son. Clearly one striking example of this is his submission to his parents (Luke 2:51), entities who were not eternal Persons incarnate, and whose human natures were marred by sin, and at a time when his wisdom was already a matter for amazement (Luke 2:46-47). In an important sense, Jesus was submissive to his inferiors. After all, this is what the Decalogue requires of a son.
- 3.26. However, Philippians 2:5-11 does not easily allow us to restrict Jesus' humility to his incarnation. He apparently takes humanity because, '...though he was in the form of God, [he] did not regard equality with

God as something to be exploited...'. He takes human nature because he is humble, not he becomes humble only after and by taking human nature.

- 3.27. This matters because it means we can meaningfully say: 'God is humble'. Katherin Rogers remarks that God is the source and cause of all goodness.⁷ Whatever is good, God has it, or rather *is* it perfectly and completely.⁸
- 3.28. However, at the moment I cannot see how, on what I think the view of AWESOME participants is, virtues of humility and obedience locate themselves in the eternal character of God. Humility and obedience appear to be virtues that God does not have, although humans do. To my mind this must inevitably give a frightening character to divine power, because it is not humble power.
- 3.29. This does, though, help me understand that the views of power and authority that REFORM and AWESOME participants have are necessarily very different. Humility in the Philippians 2 sense is to prefer another to oneself, which the Father critically does as he establishes his son as Lord of all in fulfilment of Psalm 110 and the Son does as he takes flesh for our salvation.
- 3.30. I confess to finding this area of difference between us highly disconcerting. At the moment I cannot see how the AWESOME construal of the Trinitarian relations allows God in eternity to be humble, or meek. I find myself wondering here in what ways humility, meekness and obedience are to be seen as positive virtues to which a Christian should aspire. What's good about them?
- 3.31. The disconcerting nature of this difference for me is that I would associate myself with the tradition of Augustine and Luther in their critique of sinful humanity as people who are curved in on themselves, and who have in Augustine's phrase the *libido dominandi*, the lust to be master. Pride and self-exaltation are deeply implicated in this, and such an attitude precludes humility and obedience.

⁷ *Perfect Being Theology* 2000. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp120,121.

⁸ Augustine emphasises that God is his attributes, rather than just having them, and Anselm builds on this in his own perfect being theology in the *Monologion*.

- 3.32. Yet the biblical model of the exercise of power is clearly not self-exaltation. The law for the king was precisely that he was not to exalt himself above his fellow-Israelites (Deuteronomy 17:20), while the pattern that Christ himself gives is of a servant king (Mark 10:45), who washes feet (John 13). In the present instance the former example is especially telling. Not everyone could be king, but the one God appointed could not exalt himself. To REFORM participants it is not obvious why the vesting of certain offices in men should therefore be seen as inconsistent with ontological equality between the sexes.
- 3.33. Hence for all these reasons, we find ourselves unable to subscribe to an egalitarian version of the Trinity.
- 3.34. It also follows, given our ordinal rather than egalitarian understandings of marriage and Trinity, that we think it perfectly coherent to argue for a view of 1 Tim 2 which asserts both ontological equality and ordinal relationships.
- 3.35. I have already written on 1 Tim 2 for these conversations, and would only stress here the reason Paul gives for his prohibition, which relates to both Genesis 2 and Genesis 3. Since Adam the male shirked his authority responsibilities, given in Genesis 2, by preferring his wife's authority to God's in Genesis 3, it is intelligible that the community redeemed from Adam's disobedience reflects that as men accept authority responsibilities, which authority responsibilities must be discharged on the pattern of the humble, servant-king Son.

General

- 3.36. I return here to the question of justice requiring identical treatment. I feel bound to observe that God does not distribute things evenly. Some run faster, some think better, some are given wealth, and some are given kingdoms to rule. Nor is this different within the household of God. Aaron and his sons constituted the priestly order, and others could not appoint themselves as priests, as the judgment on the rebellion of Korah in Numbers 16 illustrates. In the New Testament church different gifts are given, and there is no indication that this is on merit. The gifts are given as the Spirit sovereignly wills. To that extent we see nothing inconceivable in the Spirit by his word restricting particular offices to a particular range of person.

- 3.37. I close with four observations.
- 3.38. First, as a result of these conversations, I think the theological differences between REFORM and AWESOME are very considerable.
- 3.39. Secondly, I was deeply dismayed to hear that the AWESOME side felt that the issues of marriage and Trinity had received adequate coverage in our last conversation. From the viewpoint of REFORM participants, this was very far from the case. This leads me to suspect, quite possibly unfairly, that the scale of these differences and their implications have not yet been thought through on the AWESOME side.
- 3.40. Thirdly, it seems to me that the egalitarian principle is one that shapes others within the network of ideas that we have discussed. Since this is the dominant principle, this means that AWESOME participants will eventually align with those who share this principle rather than with REFORM that does not.
- 3.41. Fourthly, I therefore anticipate that while AWESOME participants may regret the long-term exclusion of the evangelicalism that REFORM represents from the Church of England, they will think it a price worth paying for the sake of the egalitarian principle, and therefore will not insist on acceptable levels of legal protection for REFORM style evangelicals. Naturally, I would love to be wrong about this and for AWESOME participants to re-consider the place of the egalitarian principle in their network of ideas about marriage, Trinity and church.